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Abstract
In this paper, we reassess labor-market adjustment using an indicator of occupational
income unfairness (OIU) that shows whether workers are paid what is warranted by their
eort. Although an empirically derived unfairness indicator does not necessarily reect
workers' perceived unfairness, OIU values in some occupation groups such as professionals,
sales, and production have stabilized around zero over the past 24 years. This indicates
the existence of a labor-market adjustment mechanism in such occupation groups. We use
contribution analysis to nd that the stabilization of OIU is largely explained by changing
education level and work hours with the aging eect and the gender eect having only
small eects on unfairness.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature documenting rising income inequality in most developed coun-
tries since the 1980s. The main explanation for this phenomenon is that the demand for
skills has outgrown the supply of high-skilled workers to increase the skills premium (Katz
and Autor (1999)). Although, according to neoclassical economic theory, the labor market
adjusts to reduce such income inequality in the long run, this mechanism does not seem
to be working. On the demand side, the skills-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis
helps to explain the failure of this adjustment mechanism (Acemoglu and Autor (2011)).
On the supply side, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) and Autor, Katz and Kearney
(2008) indicate the slowdown of supply of high-skilled workers. They focus on a divergence
of upper-tail and lower-tail wage inequality. They nd that the upper half (90{50) wage
dierentials continuously increased from the late 1970s. In contrast, the lower half (50{10)
wage dierentials increased until the late 1980s and stagnate thereafter. These contrasting
behaviors account for the slowing of whole economy wage inequality since the late 1980s.
They also conclude that changes in the real minimum wage do not explain much of the
secular growth of upper half wage inequality, and that rapid growth of relative demand for
skills caused mainly by SBTC and slowdown in relative supply for college graduates since
the late 1980s adequately explain wage inequality trends. The question on the supply side
is why has growth in the supply of high-skilled labor been so slow?
We reassess the labor market adjustment mechanism. We investigate whether work-
ers' occupational choices are based on trading o rewards against eort requirements.
Clearly, because high-income occupations require much eort in the form of higher ed-
ucation, training and long hours, some workers may avoid such occupations. These cri-
teria for occupational choice relate to a strand of modern political philosophy known as
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism theory. From this point of view, persistent income
inequality is not necessarily a problem: it arises from dierences in workers' eort levels,
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which can be acceptable (we call it \fair"). If workers base their occupational choices on
such criteria, the labor market cannot eliminate income inequality even in the long run.
However, the labor market may be able to reduce income inequality by another means.
Occupations that pay more than is warranted, based on worker eort, will attract many
job applicants. Then, workers may be paid no more than what is warranted by their ef-
fort. In recent studies, empirical methods have been developed to determine fair incomes.
Following the empirical method developed by Almas et al. (2011), we derive individual
workers' fair incomes, and dene \income unfairness" as the ratio of actual income to fair
income. Then, we aggregate these levels of income unfairness by occupation group. Our
interest is whether the income unfairness levels of each occupation group have strayed
from zero in the long run. We use US labor statistics from 1992 to 2015.
We nd that workers in occupation groups such as professionals, sales, and production
are rewarded based on income unfairness ratios. For these occupations, the ratio has
hardly strayed from zero over the past 24 years. However, for other occupation groups,
the adjustment of labor supply does not work. Workers in managerial occupations have
received much more than their fair income, whereas oce workers and those in service
occupations have received much less. We also nd that workers' educational level and
work hours play a central role in whether unfairness levels strayed from zero.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the empirical method
used to calculate a fair income and the income unfairness indicator. In Section 3, we
introduce the data source and present an occupation classication. In Section 4, we
describe our empirical results and present the contribution analysis. In Section 5, we
discuss the relationship between income unfairness and recent labor-market issues such as
job polarization and globalization. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Empirical Method
2.1 Fair Income
In this section, we show how the fair income of each worker can be calculated. We suppose
that there areN = f1;    ; ng workers in the economy and that worker i is characterized by
a vector of response variables xRi (e.g. education level, work hours, etc.) and nonresponse
variables xNRi (e.g. age, gender, etc.). We assume that pretax income yi is determined by
the following function:
yi = f(x
R
i ; x
NR
i ):
We estimate this income function using cross-section data on workers. We use a log-linear
labor income model:
ln yi = x
R
i + x
NR
i + i:
Thus, the income function can be rewritten as:
yi = exp(x
R
i ) exp(x
NR
i + i):
The next step is to construct a worker's claim for redistribution. We apply the gen-
eralized proportionality principle developed by Cappelen and Tungodden (2010). The
worker's claim for redistribution depends only on each worker's response factors. The
nonresponse factors are shared by all workers. We dene the worker's claim for redistri-
bution as g(xRi ; ), and calculate it as follows:
g(xRi ; ) =
1
n
X
j
f(xRi ; x
NR
j ) =
1
n
exp(xRi )
X
j
exp(xNRj + j):
Then, we derive the fair income of each worker by sharing the total pretax income in
the economy by using the worker's claim for redistribution. Letting zi be the fair income
of worker i and letting Y be total pretax income in the economy means that zi can be
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calculated as:
zi =
g(xRi ; )P
j g(x
R
j ; )
Y:
2.2 Income Inequality and Income Unfairness
In this section, we dene two types of income deviation indicators: income inequality
and income unfairness. Income inequality is dened as ei = yi=y   1, where y is average
aggregate income. It measures the percentage deviation of worker i's income from the
average income. For example, ei = 0:2 means that worker i receives 20% more than the
average income. Income unfairness is dened as ui = yi=zi 1. It measures the percentage
deviation of worker i's income from his or her fair income. ui =  0:1 means that worker
i receives 10% less than his or her fair income. That is, the worker is paid 10% less than
is warranted by his or her eort.
We also dene two types of aggregate income deviation indicator for each occupation
group: occupation income inequality (OII) and occupation income unfairness (OIU). The
former is dened as the average of each worker's income inequality ei conditional on
their occupation group. It simply measures the percentage deviation of an occupation
average income from average aggregate income. Similarly, OIU is dened as the average
of each worker's income unfairness ui conditional on their occupation group. In this paper,
OIU is an important indicator because it measures how attractive the occupation is. In
an occupation with a high OIU, payment is disproportionately high, based on workers'
eort.
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3 Data
3.1 Data Source
The data used for our research are from the March samples of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) conducted by the US Census Bureau for 1992 to 2015. The dependent
variable is the log of individual earnings, and the independent variables are education
level, work hours, age, and dummy variables for gender, race (`black' and `other'), public
sector employment, and metropolitan residence.
Following Almas et al. (2011), we treat education level, work hours, and dummy
variables for public sector employment and metropolitan residence as responsible factors,
and treat age and dummy variables for gender and race as nonresponse factors.
We include in the sample only persons aged 20{60 years with an annual income of
USD 10,000{1,000,000, who worked 20{99 hours per week for 30{52 weeks per year and
had at least nine years of education.
The regression coecients are summarized in Table 1. All response and nonresponse
variables have statistically signicant signs. The response variables, education, work
hours, and metropolitan residence have positive signs, although public sector has a neg-
ative sign. Women, black and other race workers tend to earn less than men and white
workers.
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Table 1: Regression Results
Year 1992 2004 2015
Obs. 27,994 47,684 46,411
Education 0:068225 0:088962 0:097294
Work hours 0:000278 0:000381 0:000417
Metropolitan 0:165825 0:179773 0:124423
Public sector  0:01709  0:06113  0:03608
Age 0:013297 0:011556 0:012029
Women  0:25485  0:23983  0:23176
Black  0:08573  0:10149  0:12069
Other  0:01682  0:0393  0:0235
3.2 Occupation Classication
We classify occupations into six groups: management, professional, service, sales, oce
work, and production1. Because the occupation classication of the CPS changed oc-
casionally over the period under study, we carefully categorize occupations to minimize
the impact of these changes. The occupation classication used in this paper is shown
in table 2 and 3. According to Jaimovich and Siu (2012), management and professional
occupations tend to be highly paid and highly skilled occupations. In contrast, service
occupations are low-paid and low-skilled occupations. Sales, oce, and production occu-
pations are middle skilled.
1We also dened an occupation group for workers in transportation, but because this category had few
workers, we omitted it from the paper.
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Table 2: Occupation Classication (1992{2001)
1990 Occupation groups
Management Executive, administrative, and managerial
Professional Professional specialty
Technicians and related support
Service Service occupations
Sales Sales occupations
Oce Administrative support, including clerical
Production Precision production, craft, and repair
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors
Table 3: Occupation Classication (2002{2015)
2002 Occupation groups
Management Management, business, and nancial operations
Professional Professional and related occupations
Service Service occupations
Sales Sales and related occupations
Oce Oce and administrative support occupations
Production Construction and extraction occupations
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
Production occupations
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics by occupation for year 1992 and year 2015. Most
occupations displayed increasing education level; however, service, sales, and production
occupations experienced little change. Average work hours decreased by 40 hours over
the 24 years. Work hours in service and sales occupations decreased by over 100 hours
while production occupations experienced an increase. Although the average age and the
proportion of women increased in most occupations, the average age in service occupations
and the proportion of women in oce occupations decreased.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Edu.level Work hours Age Prop.women
Year 1992
Average 13.814 2184.43 37.795 0.401
Management 14.780 2283.05 39.403 0.394
Professional 15.916 2177.07 38.183 0.477
Service 12.800 2140.88 37.506 0.424
Sales 13.900 2296.21 37.241 0.333
Oce 13.162 2068.70 37.195 0.788
Production 12.336 2153.43 37.184 0.152
Year 2015
Average 14.798 2145.35 40.820 0.495
Management 15.561 2275.53 42.481 0.456
Professional 16.328 2119.32 41.157 0.587
Service 13.193 2018.87 38.302 0.548
Sales 14.273 2186.93 39.834 0.441
Oce 13.921 2043.12 40.468 0.745
Production 12.674 2169.85 40.384 0.127
Figure 1 shows the evolution of workers in each occupation group. Although the
proportions of management and professional workers (i.e., high-skilled) and service workers
(low-skilled) have increased over the 24 years, those of other workers (middle-skilled) have
decreased. This phenomenon is known as job polarization.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Workers
4 Results
4.1 The Evolution of OII and OIU
In this section, we report the empirical results, focusing on the evolution of OII and
OIU for each occupation group. Figure 2 shows the evolution of OII for each occupation
group from 1992 to 2015. Management occupations have the highest average income,
followed by professional, sales, production, oce, and service occupations. Workers in
management occupations receive 30% more than the average income, whereas those in
production occupations receive 20% less and oce workers and those in service occupations
both receive 30% less than the average income. The time-series data show that income
inequality has increased over the past 24 years. Indeed, OII in management occupations
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increased by 10 percentage points (pp). In contrast, in the other occupations, except
for professionals, OII decreased by 5{10 pp. In 1992, OII diered by 60 pp between the
highest- and lowest-ranked occupation groups; by 2015, this dierence had increased to
80 pp.
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Figure 2: OII
Figure 3 shows the evolution of OIU, which diers from that of OII. Although profes-
sional, sales, and production occupations have dierent average incomes, their OIU values
have remained around zero. Whereas the OII values for sales and production declined by
5 pp in the last 24 years, their OIU values hardly changed. The 15% more than their
fair income that workers in management occupations received in 1992 had become 25%
by 2008. Oce workers and those in service occupations received 20% less than their fair
income. Figure 2 and 3 indicate that changes in OII have varied roughly twice as much
as changes in OIU. These results suggest that some adjustment mechanism may stabilize
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changes in OIU relative to those in OII. In the next section, we investigate causes of
stabilization of OIU.
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Figure 3: OIU
4.2 Contribution Analysis
Why has OIU in some occupational groups stayed around zero in the long run? In this
section, we present a contribution analysis to specify the causes of stabilization of OIU.
For this reason, we introduce notation used in the rest of this paper.
We dene k as an occupation group (e.g., management, professional, etc.) and  k as
all remaining occupation groups without k. xRk is an average of responsible variables in
occupation group k, and xNRk is an average of nonresponse variables in occupation group
k. Nk is an observation of k and k is the average residual of k .
Second, we construct a reduced-form economy in which there are six occupational
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representatives each of whom has average occupational characteristics. We dene g(xRk )
as an average claim for redistribution in occupation group k:
g(xRk ) =
1
N
exp(xRk )[Nk exp(x
NR
k + k) +N k exp(x
NR
 k +  k)]:
We calculate an occupation's fair income by using the average claim for redistribution,
and then derive the OIU of the reduced-form economy. Figure 4 presents our estimates
of OIU under the reduced-form economy. We use this OIU as the benchmark.
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Figure 4: OIU (reduced-form economy)
We suggest three reasons for the value of OIU changing. First, an occupation group
in which average income increases, other things being equal, experiences an increase in its
OIU. An example is management, in which average incomes have increased during almost
every one of the past 24 years. In contrast, average incomes in service occupations have
decreased over the same period.
Second, changes in occupation groups' response variables such as average educational
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levels and average working hours can aect their fair income and thus their OIU. To
estimate the eect of changing response variables, we dene a counterfactual average
claim for redistribution in occupation group k as follows:
g(x^Rk;j) =
1
N
exp(x^Rk;j)[Nk exp(x
NR
k + k) +N k exp(x
NR
 k +  k)];
where x^Rk;j = (x
R
k;1;    ; xRk;j 1; xR k;j ; xRk;j+1;    ; xRk;J) is a vector of response factors of
occupation k in which an element j is replaced with xR k;j .
We calculate each counterfactual occupation fair income by using g(x^Ri;j) for i = k
and g(xRi ) for i 6= k and derive the dierence of OIU from the benchmark case.
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Figure 5: Eect on OIU of changing education level
In Figure 5, we estimate that the increase of sales workers' education level increase
their OIU by 4 pp from 1992 to 2015. Although average incomes in sales occupations
declined by 6 pp from 1992 to 2015 (see Figure 2), OIU in sales did not change (see
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Figure 4). This is because the average education level of sales workers declined over the
same period: in 1992, sales workers averaged 0.09 more years of education than workers
overall but by 2015, they had 0.51 fewer years than workers in general. Therefore, the
declining average education level in sales occupations also decreases their fair income.
Similarly, OII in production occupations declined by 5.5 pp from 1992 to 2015; however,
the respective OIU decreased by less than 1 pp. Figure 5 shows that the increase of
production workers' education level increases their OIU by 3.5 pp over the same period.
In Figure 6, we also estimate an eect on OIU of changing average work hours in each
occupation group. The decreasing work hours in service and sales occupations increases
their OIU by 1.5 pp.
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Figure 6: Eect on OIU of changing work hours
Third, changes in occupation groups' nonresponse variables such as workers' average
age and the proportion of women workers can aect their OIU. There is a technical
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reason for this. When we calculate the fair income of each worker, the eect of their
age is distributed over the whole economy. Because older workers typically earn higher
incomes, their fair income tends to be low. Therefore, occupation groups in which average
age increases experience an increase in their OIU. Intuitively, young workers do not enter
unattractive occupations (which have a low OIU value). As a result, the average age
of workers in these occupations increases, and this raises their OIU (the \aging eect").
As for the case of changing response factors, we also dene g(xRk ) as a counterfactual
average claim for redistribution in occupation group k:
g(xRk ; x^
NR
k;j ) =
1
N
exp(xRk )[Nk exp(x^
NR
k;j + k) +N k exp(x
NR
 k +  k)];
where x^NRk;j = (x
NR
k;1 ;    ; xNRk;j 1; xNR k;j ; xNRk;j+1;    ; xNRk;J ) is a vector of nonresponse factors
of occupation k in which an element j is replaced with xNR k;j .
We calculate each counterfactual occupation fair income by using g(xRi ; x^NRi;j ) for
i = k and g(xRi ) for i 6= k and derive the dierence of OIU with the benchmark case.
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Figure 7: Aging eect
In Figure 7, we estimate the aging eect on OIU in each occupation group, and conrm
that increasing the average age in production and oce occupations increases their OIU
by 0.15 pp from 1992 to 2015. However, the aging eect is very small.
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Figure 8: Gender eect
Similarly, in Figure 8, we estimate an eect of the changing proportion of women
workers on OIU in each occupation group (the \gender eect"). Figure 8 shows that the
decreasing percentage of women in oce occupations increases OIU by 0.4 pp. Similar to
the aging eect, the gender eect is also small.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the relationship between our research and recent labor-market
issues. We rst consider the phenomenon known as job polarization. Job polarization
refers to a shift from middle-skilled occupations toward high-skilled and low-skilled occu-
pations. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) show
that the US has been experiencing job polarization since the 1980s. Goos and Manning
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(2007) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009) document job polarization in Europe. In
our classication of occupations, the middle-skilled are sales, oce workers, and produc-
tion occupations, and average incomes in these occupations have declined. This has led
to workers aging in these occupations: according to our data, the average age of middle-
skilled occupations has increased over the past 24 years. In contrast, the average age of
workers in service occupations (i.e., low-skilled) has declined relatively sharply. Autor
and Dorn (2013) point out that nowadays computers have taken over many of the routine
tasks of low-skilled workers, who have consequently transferred to service occupations.
This is the reason OIU in service occupations remains low.
Second, we consider why OIU in management occupations remains so high. The theory
of Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2012) predicts that openness raises the fraction of managerial
jobs in a high-skill economy. The theory indicates that there is a large demand for
management workers in the US and other developed countries. This may explain the
evolution of OIU in management occupations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we reassessed labor-market adjustment using an indicator of occupational
income unfairness (OIU). Although an empirically derived unfairness indicator does not
necessarily reect workers' perceived unfairness, OIU in some occupations indicates the
existence of a labor-market adjustment mechanism. However, unfairness remains in some
occupations, perhaps because it is caused by structural development problems. We also
presented a contribution analysis and found that changing education level and work hours
mainly explain the stabilization of OIU. The aging eect and the gender eect also con-
tribute to adjusting the level of unfairness, although these eects tend to be small.
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